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Abstract
Several variants of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox are considered, with the
objective of exploring the logical foundations of physics. It is shown that
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox leads to contradictions at the metamathemat-
ical (as opposed to formal) level in the basic classical infinitary reasoning
that is routinely used in theoretical physics. Both Newtonian mechanics
and special relativity theory suffer from these metamathematical incon-
sistencies, which occur essentially because the classical refutation of the
dichotomy paradox requires supertasks to be completed. In previous pa-
pers, Non-Aristotelian Finitary Logic (NAFL) was proposed as a logical
foundation for some of the basic principles of quantum mechanics, such
as, quantum superposition and entanglement. We outline how the fini-
tistic and paraconsistent reasoning used in NAFL helps in resolving the
metamathematical inconsistencies that arise from the dichotomy paradox.
1 Zeno’s dichotomy paradox
Probably the first serious challenge to the use of classical infinitary reasoning
in physics came from Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, in particular, the dichotomy
paradox, originally proposed by Zeno in the fifth century BC [1, 2, 3]. Zeno’s
dichotomy paradox has remained completely unresolved for over 2400 years till
date, despite claims to the contrary. And contrary to conventional wisdom,
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we will demonstrate that variants of the dichotomy paradox are not merely
philosophical paradoxes, but actually lead to logical contradictions in classical
and other systems of logic that support the infinite divisibility of space and time.
The source of these contradictions, which occur at the metamathematical (rather
than formal) level, is the fact that the classical resolution of the dichotomy
paradox requires the completion of infinite tasks or supertasks [4]. Here we
outline how these contradictions are resolved in non-Aristotelian finitary logic
(NAFL) [5, 6, 7], which is a paraconsistent, finitistic logic that, in our view,
plays an important role in the logical foundations of physics. In Part II of
this two-part series of papers [8], the logic NAFL will be explained in detail.
For a historically accurate account of Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, in the way
that Zeno actually formulated them, consult the appropriate references [1]. A
modern version of the dichotomy paradox is all we will need for our purposes
and is as follows.
Homer, initially located at (x, t) = (0, 0), runs at a constant unit velocity
along the x-axis towards a stationary target, say, a finish line located at x = 1, so
that Homer’s path is described by x(t) = t. Here x is a Cartesian coordinate and
t is a dimensionless time in the standard real number system. As confirmed by
experiment, Homer will reach the finish line in finite time, at t = 1, a conclusion
which Zeno ingeniously contradicted. According to Zeno’s argument, Homer
first has to cover half the distance to the finish line in order to reach the point
x = 1/2. He then has to cover half the remaining distance to the finish line
in order to reach the point x = 3/4, and so on, ad infinitum. Zeno concluded
that the Homer will never reach the finish line, essentially for the following two
reasons (paraphrased in modern language).
• Homer has to run through the following infinite sequence of points, one at
a time and in a finite time interval:
xn = 1− (1/2)n, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , . (1)
This is an infinite task (supertask) which, contrary to conventional wis-
dom, arguably cannot be completed in finite time. Note that Homer
reaches each point xn in (1) at the corresponding instant tn, where
tn = 1− (1/2)n, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , . (2)
• Homer has to traverse the following infinite sequence of distances in a
finite time interval:
dn = xn − xn−1 = (1/2)n, n = 1, 2, . . . , . (3)
This is another supertask with an additional paradox of the infinitely many
finite, nonzero distances dn summing to a finite distance. Our strong
intuition here is that this sum must diverge, contrary to what modern
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mathematics tells us. Note that Homer covers each distance dn in a cor-
responding duration τn, where
τn = tn − tn−1 = (1/2)n, n = 1, 2, . . . , . (4)
Next we will discuss in detail both of Zeno’s objections to Homer reaching his
target at x = 1.
1.1 Zeno’s first objection — Supertasks
Running through the infinite sequence of points in (1) in finite time is equivalent
to the process of counting the infinite sequence of natural numbers {0, 1, 2, . . .},
one at a time and in a finite time interval. It is certainly paradoxical to claim
that such a supertask can be completed, as the following argument shows.
Nonclassical induction argument Consider the process of counting the nat-
ual numbers in sequence. At any instant t during the counting process,
at most one natural number n is counted and an infinite number of nat-
ural numbers remains uncounted. Since this is true for arbitrary t and
n, one can conclude by induction that infinitely many natural numbers
will always remain uncounted during every moment of such a counting
process, which can therefore never be completed. In fact such a counting
process does not even get started, and any ‘progress’ made in the count-
ing is purely illusory, because the infinitely many uncounted numbers will
always map one-to-one and onto the full sequence of natural numbers.
In our opinion, this induction argument is correct, despite (as we will show later)
there being a classically unacceptable interchange of universal and existential
quantifiers that is inherent in its conclusion. Therefore, the heavy machinery
of modern mathematics and classical logic notwithstanding, Zeno’s dichotomy
paradox has never been satisfactorily resolved till date. Note that the nonclas-
sical induction argument holds regardless of the speed of the counting process,
which can never be completed, even in principle.
Define a local counting rate κn at each (xn, tn) as the reciprocal of the time
taken by Homer to reach the next point xn+1. From (4), we conclude that
κn = 1/τn+1 = 2
n+1, n = 0, 1, 2, . . . , .
Here κn has to be understood as locally defining the rate at which the points of
the sequence (1) are covered per unit time by Homer at each (xn, tn). Thus the
counting rate is two points per unit time at (x0, t0) = (0, 0), four points per unit
time at (x1, t1) = (1/2, 1/2), and increases exponentially with n. Nevertheless,
only one point xn of (1) is covered at each tn, and in accordance with the
nonclassical induction argument, there are always infinitely many points of this
sequence that remain uncovered during each moment of Homer’s run on t ∈
[0, 1). Yet, we find that at t = 1 Homer has mysteriously bridged this seemingly
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unbridgeable gap and has covered all the (infinitely many) points xn to reach
x = 1. Note that the counting rate at (x, t) = (1, 1) is zero because nothing
remains to be counted.
In summary, Zeno’s first objection may be stated concisely as follows. An
infinite counting process that, by our nonclassical induction argument, did not
even get started at any t ∈ [0, 1) is deemed to be complete at t = 1, at which
time nothing gets counted! Note that Zeno’s first objection, though stated
here in terms of the infinite sequence of spatial points xn covered by Homer,
applies equally to the infinite sequence of instants tn in (2). Zeno could have
asked, with equal validity, how Homer managed to complete experiencing (not
necessarily consciously) infinitely many instants tn sequentially and in a finite
time interval. Thus we may conclude that Zeno’s first objection strikes at the
infinite divisibility of space and time, which is a technicality that is routinely
accepted today by modern mathematicians and physicists.
1.2 Zeno’s second objection — convergence of infinite sum-
mations
The classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox depends crucially on the
following result:
∞∑
n=1
dn =
∞∑
n=1
τn =
∞∑
n=1
(1/2)n = 1. (5)
Here dn and τn are as defined in (3) and (4) respectively. Note that each
term in these infinite summations is finite and positive. Given that there are
no nonzero infinitesimals in the standard real number system, the question is
how these infinitely many positive terms can sum to a finite magnitude. Our
strong intuition here is that these infinite summations must diverge, despite
the justification of (5) by modern mathematics. This intuition arises because
infinitely many times any positive magnitude, no matter how small, is always
infinite. One might attempt to argue that this intuition is wrong in the context
of (5) because while each term (1/2)n in these summations is positive, there is
no smallest term and secondly, because of the following mathematical fact:
∞⋂
n=1
[0, (1/2)n] = {0}. (6)
Evidently, the intersection of the infinitely many nested intervals in (6) consists
of the single point zero. Therefore one might argue that there is no apparent
contradiction in the infinitely many positive magnitudes (1/2)n summing to
a finite magnitude because no positive magnitude gets added infinitely many
times, as our intuition tells us. However, this explanation only shifts the burden
to (6), namely, how did infinitely many nested intervals, each of which has a
positive length, intersect to a single point? Again our strong intuition is that if
none of these nested intervals has a zero length, their intersection must also be
an interval of positive length.
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Hence Zeno’s second objection is essentially that the infinite summations
in (5) must diverge and consequently Homer will never reach the finish line at
x = 1. Note that Homer has to cover the distances dn sequentially in time,
which implies that Zeno’s first objection is also embedded in this supertask.
1.3 The classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox
The classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox employs modern mathe-
matics to essentially establish the following.
• Homer does experience the actual infinity of instants tn in (2) during which
he crosses, in sequence, the actual infinity of points xn in (1). Note that
Homer completes two simultaneous supertasks here, one of which is purely
temporal and the other, spatio-temporal.
• The infinite summations in (5) do converge to a finite value as indicated.
• From the premise that Homer has completed the supertasks of sequentially
traversing the infinitely many distances dn in the infinitely many durations
τn, one may conclude [2] that Homer has reached x = 1 at t = 1.
Note that the distances dn, and likewise, the durations τn, are entirely contained
in the half open real interval [0, 1). Therefore nontrivial arguments are needed
for a proof of the final of the above points. The first step is to observe that the
convergence of the infinite summations in (5) implies that Homer, after travers-
ing these infinitely many distances/durations sequentially, must necessarily have
reached a point infinitesimally close to x = 1 at an instant infinitesimally close
to t = 1. The next step is to use the fact that the standard real number sys-
tem does not contain any nonzero infinitesimals in order to conclude, as noted
above, that Homer must necessarily have reached x = 1 at t = 1. This clas-
sically acceptable inference requires the assumption that Homer must exist at
t = 1 after traversing the unit distance, which we take for granted in this paper.
Benacerraf [9] has attempted to refute this inference via his postulation of a
shrinking genie in place of Homer in Zeno’s dichotomy paradox. However, Be-
nacerraf’s attempt fails because his genie does not meet the stated requirement
of existence at t = 1. In Sec. 3, we demonstrate that Benacerraf’s shrinking
genie, which covers all the points x ∈ [0, 1) and then vanishes before reaching
x = 1, is of interest in its own right because it is even more paradoxical than
Zeno’s original formulation of the dichotomy.
The mathematical machinery needed to prove these results initially emerged
with the development of the calculus by Newton and Leibniz in the seven-
teenth century. Over the next two hundred years or so, further work by Euler,
Bolzano, Cantor, Cauchy, Dedekind, Frege, Hilbert, Lebesgue, Peano, Russell,
Weierstrass and Whitehead, among others, culminating in the development of
Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory in the early twentieth century, finally provided the
various concepts needed to develop standard real analysis without the notion
of nonzero infinitesimals. Today the majority view in the mainstream research
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community is that Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory with the axiom of choice (ZFC)
provides rigorous foundations for standard real analysis, in which Zeno’s para-
doxes, among others, stand successfully refuted. See, for example, Ref. [10],
where the authors assert that “. . . our notions of infinity and continuity are now
so well developed that supertasks have lost their power to force refinement of
these notions.” It must also be emphasized that there still exists a significant
dissenting minority view. Alternative systems, such as, predicative analysis [11]
or nonstandard analysis [12], have been proposed for the resolution of Zeno’s
paradoxes.
The nonclassical induction argument given in Sec. 1.1 stands refuted in clas-
sical logic because of a classically unacceptable interchange of universal and
existential quantifiers that is inherent in this argument. Thus to go from
∀t ∈ [0, 1) ∃n ∈ N (tn > t) (7)
to
∃n ∈ N ∀t ∈ [0, 1) (tn > t) (8)
is a classically unacceptable deduction. Here N is the class of all natural num-
bers, {0, 1, 2, . . .}. Eq. (7) correctly asserts that Homer has experienced only
finitely many instants tn (as defined in (2)) up to each given time t ∈ [0, 1).
Eq. (8) unsuccessfully attempts a seemingly straightforward generalization of
(7) to the entire half open time interval [0, 1). In words, what the deduction of
(8) from (7) expresses is that if only finitely many instants tn have passed up to
each given time t ∈ [0, 1), then only finitely many of the instants tn can pass in
the entire time interval [0, 1) and infinitely many of these instants will always
remain inaccessible, which is precisely what the nonclassical induction argument
asserts. In effect this deduction calls into question the very existence of the time
interval [0, 1) by rejecting its infinite divisibility via the sequential passage of
infinitely many instants tn. In support of this classically banned deduction, it
is natural to expect that what is true of each t ∈ [0, 1) must also be true of the
entire time interval [0, 1) in the following sense. If each t ∈ [0, 1) is bounded
above by some tn (as asserted in (7)), then the collection of all such instants t
that are bounded above by some tn is precisely the time interval [0, 1), which
essentially expresses that all the instants t ∈ [0, 1) have been exceeded by some
tn. In other words, each means all and this is exactly what (8) asserts.
1.3.1 Comments on the classical refutation
Eq. (8) requires the existence of an integer ρ such that Homer experiences only
the ρ+ 1 instants (t0, t1, . . . , tρ) in the time interval [0, 1). Clearly ρ cannot be
any of the standard, finite integers and therefore such a tρ cannot exist within
the standard real number system under consideration here. But in nonstandard
analysis, a restricted form of the deduction of (8) from (7) is required for the
existence of nonstandard numbers [13]. Therefore, in our view, the banning of
the deduction of (8) from (7) within classical logic is somewhat arbitrary and
does not have a clear logical basis.
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What (7) establishes is that Homer can never consciously experience the
sequential passage of infinitely many instants tn, and that this is not just a
practical limitation of the human mind, but a logical impossibility. What Homer
actually experiences during the time interval [0, 1) is an ever increasing, but
always finite number of instants tn. It is only at t = 1 that Homer retroactively
concludes that all the instants tn have indeed passed in the interval [0, 1), but
with no recollection even possible of how this transition from finite to infinite
happened. One might attempt to argue that infinitely many instants tn actually
passed in an infinitesimal time interval as t→ 1− and that the human mind is
incapable of grasping infinitesimals. However this explanation is refuted by the
fact that in the standard real number system in which we are operating, the
only infinitesimal magnitude is zero.
Nevertheless, the fact is that classical logic does block the deduction of (8)
from (7), thus effectively allowing the existence of infinitely many instants tn in
the time interval [0, 1) as a Platonic reality that is independent of the human
mind. In the logic NAFL that we have proposed [5, 6, 7, 8], mathematical truths
are formulated as axiomatic assertions of the human mind and NAFL rejects
the philosophy of Platonism that is inherent in classical logic. From the point
of view of NAFL, Homer’s path is not ‘pre-existing’, but is actually constructed
by him as he runs. NAFL accepts that the nonclassical induction argument
given in Sec. 1.1 correctly establishes the logical impossibility of providing a
construction for the completion of a supertask, such as, traversing infinitely
many spatial / temporal points or distances / durations sequentially. In the
NAFL version of real analysis [8, 7], the half open real interval [0, 1) and the
infinite sequences (1) and (2) do not exist. Therefore it is impossible to even
formulate Zeno’s dichotomy paradox in NAFL. The paradoxical blocking of the
deduction of (8) from (7) is also avoided because it is impossible to legitimately
state (7) in NAFL theories. Despite these seemingly severe restrictions, the
NAFL version of real analysis does admit the infinite divisibility of space and
time, albeit in a more restricted sense than in classical logic.
The arguments in support of the classical formulation are that it effec-
tively blocks Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, and that despite its nonconstructive
and counterintuitive nature, no formal contradiction can be deduced. Further,
the unrestricted infinite divisibility of space and time in the classical formulation
has proven to be a highly useful idealization in modern scientific theories. In our
opinion, what is mathematically or scientifically legitimate and rigorous must be
determined purely by logical considerations. The perceived usefulness of classi-
cal theories does not justify the use of infinitary reasoning in these theories if
there are logical objections to such use. Such logical objections must ideally be
in the form of demonstrated contradictions, either formal or metamathemati-
cal, and we will pursue this in the ensuing sections. Here, a metamathematical
contradiction is a contradiction outside of the formalism, which is often a for-
mal theory in classical logic and is required to be a formal theory in NAFL.
Therefore we will often use the words metamathematical and metatheoretical
interchangeably.
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1.4 Dichotomy paradox in an infinite relay run
Our goal is to demonstrate that the classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy
paradox does indeed lead to a logical contradiction. We first consider a scenario
in which Homer’s run on x ∈ [0, 1) is replaced by that of infinitely many men,
say, Homer(n), n ∈ N , where N is the class of all natural numbers. This run,
an infinite relay, is specified as follows.
• For each n ∈ N , Homer(n) starts his run at (x, t) = (xn, tn) and ends
it at (x, t) = (xn+1, tn+1). Here xn and tn are as defined in (1) and (2)
respectively.
• It follows that for each n ∈ N , Homer(n) runs at average unit velocity
in the specified spatial and temporal domains. Note that this requires
Homer(n), who is at zero velocity at the start of his run, to accelerate to
some finite velocity v ≥ 1 and then decelerate to zero velocity at the end
of his run.
• For each n ∈ N , Homer(n) carries a baton which he relays instantaneously
to Homer(n+ 1).
• Consider the special case where, for each n ∈ N , Homer(n) (with the ba-
ton) is imparted a positive impulse at t = tn and a negative impulse at
t = tn+1 that take him instantaneously to unit and zero velocities respec-
tively. This case is interesting because the baton travels continuously at
unit velocity on t ∈ [0, 1), as does Homer in the original formulation of the
dichotomy paradox. We may also consider the specific example in which
Homer(0), with the baton, is imparted a positive impulse at t = 0 that
takes him to unit velocity and all subsequent impulses for 0 < t < 1 are im-
parted due to elastic collisions, with transfer of baton, between Homer(n)
and Homer(n+ 1) for each n ∈ N . This case is very similar to the “beau-
tiful supertask” of Laraudogoitia [14], with the only difference being that
Laraudogoitia does not have a baton in his supertask. In particular, note
the failure of the conservation of momentum, because all the Homer(n)
are at rest at t = 1, while at t = 0, Homer(0) is at unit velocity.
At the outset, let us note that this is a highly idealized scenario. Each of the
infinitely many Homer(n) and the baton are taken to be point masses. Further,
as n→∞, Homer(n) will be subjected to unbounded accelerations and deceler-
ations because of the need to maintain an average unit velocity over increasingly
short distances. Nevertheless, the impulses imparted to the Homer(n) are finite
and bounded as n→∞. Indeed, infinite accelerations are routinely handled in
Newtonian mechanics, for example, during elastic collisions. Hence there are no
fatal logical objections to this formulation.
It is clear that Homer’s supertasks, discussed in Secs. 1.1 and 1.2, have been
broken up into infinitely many finite tasks performed by the Homer(n). There-
fore while each Homer(n) crosses only one of the intervals [xn, xn+1], the totality
of such intervals have been crossed collectively and in sequence. On the other
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hand, the baton does cross the infinite totality of these intervals sequentially and
at an average unit velocity. Therefore the baton performs the said supertasks
and plays the role of Homer in the original formulation of Zeno’s dichotomy
paradox. Let us consider this paradox in the present modified formulation.
• None of the Homer(n) reaches x = 1, in particular, at t = 1. This is
already paradoxical, because the convergence of the infinite summations
in (5) indicate that the Homer(n) collectively traveled a total unit distance
and for a total unit duration. This paradox is explained by the fact that
the Homer(n) have collectively gotten arbitrarily close to x = 1, in the
sense that as x → 1− there are infinitely many of the Homer(n) in every
neighborhood of x = 1, without any of them actually reaching x = 1.
• The formulation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox in this setting is that the
baton can never reach x = 1. Indeed, it seems almost obvious that the
baton must always remain in the possession of one of the infinitely many
Homer(n), none of whom reaches x = 1.
• The classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox now requires that the
baton does reach x = 1 at t = 1, despite the fact that it would not be in
the possession of any of the Homer(n) at (x, t) = (1, 1)! The convergence
of the infinite summations in (5) indicate that the baton traveled a total
unit distance and for a total unit duration. Therefore the baton does
cross, in sequence, an actual infinity of distances dn in an actual infinity of
durations τn, after which it must necessarily reach x = 1 at t = 1. Indeed,
at t = 1, it is clearly not possible for the baton to be at any location
x < 1, because there would always exist some Homer(n) who would have
relayed the baton beyond that point. It is important to note that there
are no nonzero infinitesimals in the standard real number system, and so
the baton cannot get arbitrarily close to x = 1 without actually reaching
x = 1. Here we define the baton to be arbitrarily close to x = 1 if its
location x satisfies 1−  < x ≤ 1 for all  > 0. The reader should carefully
contrast this situation with that of the infinitely many Homer(n), who
collectively did manage to get arbitrarily close to x = 1, without any
individual Homer(n) achieving that feat.
• It is obvious that the above classical refutation argument is highly prob-
lematic, since the baton’s motion is only possible in the first place because
one of the Homer(n) is powering it. Yet the baton reaches the finish line
on its own steam, after the human beings fail to relay it there.
1.4.1 Contradiction from the infinite relay dichotomy paradox
Let us make the reasonable metamathematical stipulation that the baton cannot
reach x = 1 on its own without being carried there by any of the Homer(n), and
add this stipulation formally as an axiom. Then the infinite relay dichotomy
paradox does result in a formal logical contradiction, namely, that the baton
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reaches x = 1 and the baton does not reach x = 1. If we choose not to add the
above stipulation as an axiom, then the contradiction will remain metamathe-
matical rather than formal.
The justification for this proposed axiom, and the consequent contradiction,
is as follows. From the true premise that the baton has been carried past the
locations x = 1 −  for each  > 0, we had previously inferred that the baton
has reached x = 1, and this is in accordance with the classical refutation of
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox. Now we would like to strengthen this inference by
specifying that the baton can only reach x = 1 by virtue of its being carried
there. This strengthening cannot be deduced formally within classical logic
because it involves a classically illegal interchange of universal and existential
quantifiers, as follows. From the premise that the baton has been carried past
each location x = 1−, one cannot automatically infer within classical logic that
the baton has been carried past all such locations to x = 1. Nevertheless, one
can see that this conclusion must follow from the stated premise. The baton’s
motion on x ∈ [0, 1), as defined in the premise, is only due to its being carried
by one of the infinitely many Homer(n) and the classically valid conclusion is
that precisely such a motion leads to the baton reaching x = 1 (according to the
classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox). The only possible conclusion
from such a premise is that the baton has been carried to x = 1, because the
premise does not define any other type of motion for the baton on x ∈ [0, 1).
But, due to the above-mentioned illegal interchange of universal and existential
quantifiers, classical logic blocks this inference, which must nevertheless remain
metamathematically valid. In Sec. 2, we will provide another justification for
this inference, using the argument of limits. What we have established as true,
but formally unprovable, is the axiom that there must exist some integer ρ such
that Homer(ρ) has carried the baton to x = 1. Incidentally, such an axiom would
solve the previously noted issue of the failure of the conservation of momentum.
But no such integer ρ exists, at least not within the standard real number system
that we have assumed, and we have the stated metamathematical contradiction,
which would become formal if we choose to add this axiom to our formal system.
Our view is that this logical contradiction, whether formal or metamathe-
matical, arises because the baton and the Homer(n) (collectively) are required
to perform supertasks, namely, traversing infinitely many spatial and temporal
intervals sequentially. Such supertasks are infinitary in nature and therefore log-
ically inadmissible according to the strictly finitistic reasoning employed in the
logic NAFL, which accepts the nonclassical induction argument of Sec. 1.1. In
Ref. [8], we will describe in detail how NAFL avoids Zeno’s dichotomy paradox
and the resulting contradictions. We should also mention here that there are
other proposed resolutions of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox which make use of non-
standard real analysis [12] or the relativistic notion of spacetime (see Sec. 3.7
of Ref. [15]). But these resolutions are also problematic and are in any case
not acceptable in the NAFL version of finitism, by whose yardstick the infini-
tary reasoning employed in relativity theory and nonstandard analysis stands
rejected.
What the infinite relay scenario illustrates is that there is a difference be-
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tween infinitely many Homer(n) relaying the baton versus Homer carrying the
baton. In the first case none of the Homer(n) reaches x = 1, whereas in the
latter scenario Homer does reach x = 1 with the baton. If one thinks about this
difference, it is inexplicable from a logical point of view. Replacing Homer by
infinitely many Homer(n) should not matter to the task at hand, namely, that of
transporting the baton from x = 0 to x = 1 at an average unit velocity. Indeed,
in the special case that we have considered, where the transfer of momentum
from Homer(n) to Homer(n + 1) occurs due to elastic collisions, the baton’s
motion on x ∈ [0, 1) is completely unaffected by the said replacement of Homer.
Clearly, the problem with this replacement, which breaks up Homer’s super-
tasks into infinitely many parts, is purely logical in nature. In our view, the
infinite relay scenario provides the clearest example of the logical illegitimacy
of supertasks, which are an essential part of classical infinitary reasoning.
1.5 Realistic versions of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox
Here we present more realistic modifications of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox in the
framework of classical logic, from which logical contradictions can be deduced.
We wish to consider a scenario in which Homer dies, either while in motion or
even while stationary. Motion is not required for this scenario, although we will
consider both cases.
Definition of consciousness. An individual is defined to be conscious (un-
conscious) if he / she is capable (incapable) of having thoughts. At a
given instant, a person who is conscious has a thought (assumed to occur
instantaneously) and a person who is unconscious has no thoughts.
Definition of death. For our purposes, death is defined as a permanent loss
of consciousness. Thus an individual is dead when he / she has lost con-
sciousness and never regains it. An individual who is not dead is defined
to be alive.
Here we are considering a sort of ‘brain death’, rather than standard clinical
death. It is clear that our definitions satisfy the following logical constraints.
• At each instant of time, a person is either conscious or unconscious.
• Loss of consciousness, when it occurs, must necessarily be instantaneous.
• At each instant of time, a person is either alive or dead.
• Death, when it occurs, must necessarily be instantaneous.
It should be emphasized that these constraints are classical requirements. From
the constraint that death must be instantaneous, it follows that there must exist
a sharp moment of death. This requirement leads to a contradiction, as will be
shown below.
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1.5.1 The spatial dichotomy paradox and contradiction
First consider Zeno’s dichotomy paradox as defined in Sec. 1, with Homer in
uniform motion on x ∈ [0, 1] at unit velocity. To this formulation, we add the
following requirement.
• Homer is conscious at all locations x ∈ [0, 1) and dies (instantaneously)
when he reaches x = 1.
It follows that Homer has crossed infinitely many spatial intervals [xn, xn+1],
as defined in (1), in a conscious state. The infinitely many distances dn that
Homer has traversed sequentially sum to a total unit distance (see (3) and (5)).
Therefore Homer has reached a location arbitrarily close to x = 1 in a conscious
state. In other words, upon traversing these infinitely many distances, Homer’s
location x necessarily satisfies 1 −  < x ≤ 1 for all  > 0. Since there are no
nonzero infinitesimals in the standard real number system, we conclude that
Homer has in fact reached x = 1 in a conscious state. But this contradicts
the requirement that Homer dies when he reaches x = 1. Therefore we have a
contradiction that Homer is both alive and dead at the location x = 1.
In deducing this contradiction, we have made the following inference:
(Homer has traversed infinitely many distances dn in a conscious state)⇒
(Homer has reached x = 1 in a conscious state). (9)
Note that the conclusion of (9) is a strengthening of the classical refutation of
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox discussed in Sec. 1.3, according to which one can only
conclude that ‘Homer has reached x = 1’ from the premise on the left hand side
of (9). That Homer is conscious at x = 1 cannot be formally deduced because of
a classically illegal interchange of universal and existential quantifiers involved
in such a deduction, as follows. From the premise that Homer is conscious after
crossing each location xn, one cannot automatically conclude within classical
logic that Homer is conscious at x = 1 after crossing all such locations xn.
Nevertheless, one can see that this conclusion is true for the following reason.
The premise on the left hand side of (9) uses only data from x ∈ [0, 1),
because the infinitely many distances dn (spanning the infinitely many inter-
vals [xn, xn+1] as defined in (1)) are entirely contained in [0, 1). Therefore
this premise does not include the added requirement that Homer dies when he
reaches x = 1. Hence logically, any conclusion regarding Homer drawn solely
from such a premise must necessarily require him to be in a conscious state.
In particular, the classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, as discussed
in Sec. 1.3, does permit the conclusion ‘Homer has reached x = 1’ from this
premise. This classical inference can therefore be legitimately strengthened to
that in (9).
The premise used in (9) essentially states that Homer has traversed every
point x ∈ [0, 1) in a conscious state. If nonzero infinitesimal magnitudes existed,
Homer would be conscious at some stage of the fact that he is infinitesimally
close to x = 1. But the only infinitesimal magnitude in the standard real num-
ber system is zero, which allows only the possibility of Homer being conscious
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of having reached x = 1. Indeed, it is topologically impossible for Homer to
consciously traverse the half open real interval [0, 1) without being conscious of
having reached x = 1, because Homer cannot run in such a way that he has
a point (x = 1) available that he can cover ‘next’. However, in Sec. 1.4 we
saw that it is topologically possible for infinitely many Homer(n) to collectively
traverse [0, 1) without any of the individual Homer(n) reaching the ‘next’ point
x = 1.
We have shown that (9) is true, but formally unprovable, and hence satisfies
the metamathematical requirement of an axiom. Therefore the deduced con-
tradiction must also remain metamathematical rather than formal, unless we
choose to add (9) as an axiom to our formal system.
1.5.2 The temporal dichotomy paradox and contradiction
As noted previously, there is a purely temporal version of Zeno’s dichotomy
paradox, in which Homer is not required to be in motion. The paradox is stated
as follows.
• Homer completes the supertask of experiencing (not necessarily consciously)
infinitely many instants tn, as defined in (2), sequentially in a finite time
interval [0, 1].
• The infinitely many durations τn, which Homer traverses sequentially, sum
to a total unit duration (see (4) and (5)). This is paradoxical not only
because another supertask has been performed, but also because one would
expect the sum of infinitely many finite, nonzero durations to diverge.
Hence Homer should never have been able to experience the instant t = 1,
certainly not in the alive state.
The classical refutation of the temporal dichotomy paradox proceeds as dis-
cussed in Sec. 1.3. To get a contradiction from the classical refutation, we add
the following requirement.
∀t (Homer is conscious if t ∈ [0, 1) and is dead if t ≥ 1). (10)
The infinitely many durations τn that Homer has traversed sequentially in a
conscious state sum to a total unit duration. Therefore Homer is conscious at a
time arbitrarily close to t = 1, in the sense that Homer, upon traversing these
infinitely many durations, must necessarily have experienced an instant t that
satisfies 1 −  < t ≤ 1 for all  > 0. Since there are no nonzero infinitesimals
in the standard real number system, we conclude that Homer is conscious at
t = 1. But this contradicts (10), which requires that Homer dies at t = 1.
In deducing this contradiction, we have made the following inference:
(Homer has traversed infinitely many durations τn in a conscious state)⇒
(Homer is conscious at t = 1). (11)
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The discussion of (11) proceeds entirely in analogy with that for (9). It is topo-
logically impossible for Homer to consciously traverse all the durations τn, or
equivalently, experience all instants t ∈ [0, 1), without consciously traversing the
infinitesimal duration required to experience the ‘next’ instant t = 1. However,
in Sec. 1.4 we saw that it is topologically possible for infinitely many Homer(n)
to collectively and consciously traverse the time interval [0, 1) without any of the
individual Homer(n) experiencing the instant t = 1. Eq. (11) is a strengthening
of the classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox discussed in Sec. 1.3, ac-
cording to which the conclusion on the right hand side of (11) should be ‘Homer
has experienced the instant t = 1’, without the commitment that Homer is
conscious at this instant. This strengthening is not formally permissible within
classical logic because of a classically unacceptable interchange of universal and
existential quantifiers that is inherent in its deduction, as follows. The fact
that Homer is conscious after each instant tn does not automatically imply that
Homer is conscious at t = 1, after all such instants tn. Nevertheless we may con-
clude that (11) is true, even if formally unprovable, because the premise on the
left hand side of (11) essentially states that Homer is conscious for all t ∈ [0, 1),
and it follows as a logical consequence that any conclusion regarding Homer
drawn solely from such a premise must necessarily require him to be conscious.
In particular, the classically valid conclusion drawn from this premise, namely,
‘Homer has experienced the instant t = 1’, can be legitimately strengthened to
that in (11).
We have shown that (11) is true, but formally unprovable, and hence (11)
satisfies the metamathematical requirement of an axiom. But if (11) is formally
added as an axiom, one may deduce the contradiction, from (10) and (11),
that Homer is both alive and dead at t = 1. This contradiction will remain
metamathematical if we choose not to add (11) formally as an axiom.
1.5.3 Attempted classical resolution of the contradictions
The temporal dichotomy paradox is certainly a realistic scenario, given the
constraints of classical physics and classical logic. The contradictions deduced
from both the spatial and temporal versions of the dichotomy paradox can be
seemingly resolved classically, by formulating Homer’s death as follows.
∀t (Homer is conscious if t ∈ [0, 1] and is dead if t > 1). (12)
This formulation satisfies the requirements of (9) and (11), namely, that Homer
is conscious at t = 1. Since Homer is dead in the limit t → 1+, his death can
be thought of as being instantaneous. Nevertheless, there is no precise moment
of death, because for each instant t1 > 1 at which Homer is dead, there must
also exist an instant t2 satisfying t1 > t2 > 1 at which Homer is dead. It follows
from (12) that Homer is dead at times t > 1 that are arbitrarily close to t = 1,
in the following sense:
∀ > 0 ∃t ((1 ≤ t < 1 + ) & Homer is dead at time t). (13)
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But one cannot infer from (13) that Homer is dead at times t ≥ 1 that are
infinitesimally close to t = 1 (equivalently, that Homer is dead at t = 1) because
such an inference would require a classically illegal interchange of universal and
existential quantifiers in (13). Hence the contradiction that Homer is alive and
dead at t = 1 is formally blocked and does not immediately follow from (12).
However, if we require that there must exist a precise moment of death, the said
interchange of universal and existential quantifiers in (13) would become legal
and one would conclude that such a moment of death can only be at t = 1. The
contradiction would follow. In Sec. 2, it is shown that that this contradiction
is also deducible from the failure of time reversal invariance for (12), which
is a classical requirement. Therefore the attempted classical resolution of the
contradictions from the dichotomy paradox via (12) does not really succeed.
The classical formulation of Homer’s death in (12) requires that there must
exist a final moment of consciousness, but no first moment of death. This is in
contrast to reality because the time of death is a parameter that is observable, in
the sense that it can be experimentally measured. The time of death is also rou-
tinely calculated in forensic science. On the other hand, no such measurement
or calculation of a final moment of consciousness is available or even possible.
In Ref. [8]. we will demonstrate that the proposed logic NAFL does support a
precise moment of death, as in the following modification of (10):
• Homer dies at t = 1.
By the definition of death, this automatically implies that Homer is dead when
t ≥ 1, but NAFL does not permit the classical conclusion (as stated in (10))
that Homer was alive when t ∈ [0, 1), for the following reason. The half open
real interval [0, 1) does not exist in the NAFL version of real analysis [8, 7],
which effectively blocks Zeno’s dichotomy paradox and the consequent classical
contradiction that Homer is both alive and dead at t = 1. The time-dependent
and paraconsistent nature of NAFL truth is ideally equipped to handle the
process of instantaneous death, which is modeled as a step discontinuity in real
analysis, without implying the existence of open or half open intervals of real
numbers [8]. Likewise, the formulation of Homer’s death in (12) requires the
existence of the real interval (1,∞), which is not supported in the NAFL version
of real analysis.
2 Role of supertasks in the time irreversibility
of physical processes
In this section we prove that a class of supertasks can be viewed as physically re-
alizable limit processes, wherein a limiting task must necessarily get performed
as the supertask get completed. This enables a general justification for the
various contradictions deduced previously. We also conclude that there is an
inviolable arrow of time in many discontinuous physical processes, which con-
tradicts the classical requirement of time reversal invariance [16, 17, 18] that
follows from the governing laws of nature.
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Definition of physical process. For our purposes, a physical process is in a
Euclidean setting of space and time and is governed by the laws of nature,
such as, Newton’s laws of motion or Maxwell’s laws of electromagnetism.
Further, the arrow of time exists in a physical process and is always in the
forward direction, that is, from past to present to future.
Definition of supertask. We extend the definition of supertask to any infinite
sequence of events (not necessarily performed by a human being) whose
domain is a strictly increasing, convergent sequence of times within a finite
time interval in a given physical process.
Definition of extended real number system. The affinely extended real num-
ber system R¯ is defined [19] as R¯ = R ∪ {−∞,+∞}, where R is the stan-
dard real number system and the new elements {−∞,+∞}, though not
real numbers, satisfy the intuitive definitions of arithmetical and other
operations (for example, a +∞ = +∞ + a = +∞, whenever a ∈ R¯ and
a 6= −∞). Note that the symbol +∞ is often written as just ∞ whenever
the meaning is clear from the context. For our purposes, we will need the
extended definition of the limit operation, which is again intuitive. For
example, limx→0+(1/x) = +∞ and limx→0−(1/x) = −∞.
Metatheorem 1. Consider a physical process in which the time t passes through
a strictly increasing, convergent sequence {tn}, n ∈ N , within a finite time in-
terval, and let tb = limn→∞ tn. Let S1 be the supertask defined by t assuming, in
sequence, each of the infinitely many values in {tn}. Then the minimum value
of the time at which S1 gets completed is t = tb.
Proof. The proof consists of two simple steps which follow from the fact that tb
is the limit point of the strictly increasing sequence {tn}.
• S1 is incomplete if t < tb, as seen from:
t < tb ⇔ ∃n (t < tn < tb)⇔ (S1 is incomplete).
• S1 is complete if t = tb, which is obvious because tb exceeds every value
in {tn}.
Remark 1. Metatheorem 1 is a classically valid result, because it is a mathemat-
ical fact that if t exceeds every value less than tb (as required for the completion of
S1), then t ≥ tb. However, there is a nonclassical component to Metatheorem 1
because classically, a time of completion is deemed not to exist for supertasks
(see Remark 3), which do not have a last step. Nevertheless, it is clear from
the above proof that tb does satisfy the criteria required to qualify it as a time of
completion of S1.
Remark 2. It follows from Metatheorem 1 that if the supertask S1 is com-
plete, that is, if t sequentially passes through all the infinitely many values in
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{tn}, then t must necessarily attain the limiting value tb. Hence the completion
of the supertask S1 can be viewed as a physical realization of the limit process
limn→∞ tn. Note that in the definition of a classical limit process limn→∞ tn, it
is assumed that n increases through arbitrarily large values without any require-
ment that n increases through an actual infinity of values. Hence a classical
limit process does not require the completion of a supertask, as opposed to a
physical process within classical logic. Metatheorem 1 can be generalized to a
wider range of supertasks, as will be seen from Metatheorem 2.
Metatheorem 2 (Supertasks as limit processes). Suppose that, in a given
physical process, an object has a time-dependent state S(t), where t ∈ [ta, tc]
and tc > ta. Here t is defined on the standard real number system R, while,
for our purposes, S(t) is defined on the extended real number system R¯. At
a given time tb, where ta < tb ≤ tc, suppose that limt→t−b S(t) exists. Then
S(tb) = limt→t−b S(t).
Proof. Consider any strictly increasing Cauchy sequence of times {tn}, n ∈ N ,
defined within the time interval [ta, tb) such that limn→∞ tn = tb. For ex-
ample, taking (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2), consider the sequence {tn} defined in (2).
Given the arrow of time in a physical process, the object in question com-
pletes the supertask S2 of attaining, in sequence, an actual infinity of states
S(tn), n ∈ N . Clearly, S2 occurs simultaneously with the supertask S1 defined
in Metatheorem 1, in the sense that there is a one-to-one correspondence in
time between the steps of S1 and S2. It follows that the minimum value of
the time at which S2 gets completed is t = tb. We claim that as t attains its
limiting value tb upon completion of S1, the completion of S2 must also hap-
pen with S(t) attaining its limiting value limn→∞ S(tn), which exists, because
limn→∞ S(tn) = limt→t−b S(t). For a simple proof of this claim, consider, for
illustrative purposes, the case when S(t) has a convergent series expansion of
the form
S(t) = lim
n→∞S(tn) +
∞∑
n=1
Cn(t− tb)n, t ∈ [td, tb), (14)
for some td, where ta ≤ td < tb and the Cn are constants. Clearly, as t passes
through an actual infinity of values tn, the following must hold:
∀ > 0 (|S(t)− lim
n→∞S(tn)| < ). (15)
Here |S(t)− limn→∞ S(tn)| can be viewed as a distance on the real line, which,
upon the completion of the supertask S2, must shrink to less than every pos-
itive real number . This requirement must hold by the very definition of
limn→∞ S(tn), irrespective of whether a convergent series expansion for S(t)
exists as postulated in Eq. (14). It is a direct mathematical consequence of
(15) that the completion of S2 must happen with S(t) jumping to the value
limn→∞ S(tn), because the extended real number system does not have nonzero
infinitesimals. This is so despite the fact that (14) does not define S(t) at t = tb
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and is entirely analogous to the fact that Metatheorem 1 requires the comple-
tion of S1 to happen with t jumping to the value tb, which is again outside the
domain of definition of S1. What is being asserted here is that both the values
t = tb and S(t) = limn→∞ S(tn) must be physically realized upon completion of
the supertask S2. For example, if S(t) is a velocity, then the limiting value of
the time (tb) and the velocity (limn→∞ S(tn)) will be physically attained when
S2 gets completed. It follows that S(tb) = limn→∞ S(tn) = limt→t−b S(t).
Remark 3. The completion of the supertask S2 in this proof can be viewed as
the physical realization of a limit process, as was the case for the supertask S1.
That it is not possible for an actual infinity of values in the sequence {S(tn)}
to be physically attained one at a time without the limiting value of {S(tn)}
being physically attained is a nonclassical result, which must hold despite the
fact that by definition, {S(tn)} does not contain its limit point. The definition
of {S(tn)} is a classically valid, abstract construct made without any appeal to
the notions of physical process, arrow of time or supertask. In general, classical
logic permits the completion of the supertask S2 without the commitment that
the limiting value of {S(tn)} has been attained. Classically, S2 is deemed to be
complete in t ∈ [ta, tb), despite the fact that a time of completion does not exist
in this interval [10]. This paradoxical conclusion, rejected in Metatheorem 2,
is classically justified by the fact that the supertask does not have a last step.
In the version of real analysis supported by the logic NAFL [8, 7], this classical
abstraction does not hold and sequences of real numbers are constructively de-
fined such that they must necessarily include the limit points of all convergent
subsequences.
Remark 4. To get an intuitive feel for why Metatheorem 2 must be true, con-
sider the creation of the non-negative real line [0,∞) via the following supertask.
During the time interval [tn, tn+1] as defined in (2), extend a line segment from
x = n to x = n+ 1 at uniform velocity, for each n ∈ N . Thus at t = t1 = 1/2,
the line segment [0, 1] is created, which is then extended to the line segment [0, 2]
at t = t2 = 3/4, and so on. Define S(t) as the total length of the line segment
at time t ∈ [0, 1]. We may show that
S(t) = n+ 2n+1(t− tn), t ∈ [tn, tn+1].
In particular, S(tn) = n, n ∈ N , and an application of Metatheorem 2 with
(ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 1) shows that
S(1) = lim
n→∞S(tn) = +∞.
Thus Metatheorem 2 tells us that the length of the non-negative real line is +∞,
despite the fact that it was created by extension of a line segment through a
sequence of all and only finite lengths n in the standard real number system
R (which does not include the limit point of the real sequence {n}, namely,
+∞). We can see that Metatheorem 2 is presenting the correct picture here,
for obviously one cannot extend a line segment through all finite lengths without
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creating an infinite length. Note also that the absence of ±∞ in R is a lacuna,
if one interprets the existence of the real line in this constructive sense. This
is why we have chosen the extended real number system R¯ in the statement of
Metatheorem 2. Even this does not fix the logical issue that Metatheorem 2
raises, namely, that ±∞ must necessarily be present in the real number system,
which is the case in the NAFL version of real analysis [8, 7].
Remark 5. The arrow of time in a physical process is crucially important in
the proof of Metatheorem 2, which requires the value of the state S(tb) to be the
limiting value of S(t) as t (physically) approaches tb from below. To the extent
that classical logic does not impose any such restriction on the value of S(tb),
Metatheorem 2 is a nonclassical result. For example, classical logic allows the
possibility that S(tb) = limt→t+b S(t) (assuming this limit exists) and in the case
that limt→t−b S(t) 6= limt→t+b S(t), such a result would contradict Metatheorem 2.
Even though Metatheorem 2 is formally unprovable within classical logic, one
can intuitively see it to be almost obviously true, given the arrow of time in a
physical process and given that supertasks are legitimate in classical logic. Note
that the metamathematics of classical infinitary reasoning permits the truth of
Metatheorem 2 despite the nonclassical content in its proof, because the concept
of truth is not formalizable within the languages of classical formal systems, due
to a result of Tarski (see Tarski’s undefinability theorem [20]; the precise result,
which holds for a class of formal languages with sufficient expressive power, in
the sense of being capable of expressing self-reference and diagonalization, is
that a truth predicate which identifies the true sentences of a classical formal
language is not definable within that language). Hence Metatheorem 2 satisfies
the criterion for addition to a classical formal system as an axiom, namely, that
it is true, but formally unprovable.
Corollary 1. In the physical process defined in Metatheorem 2, suppose
lim
t→t−b
S(t) 6= lim
t→t+b
S(t).
Then such a discontinuous physical process is not time reversible.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2). Metatheorem 2,
as applied in the physical time variable t, implies that S(1) = limt→1− S(t).
Make the change of variable t′ = 2 − t and let S′(t′) = S(t). To arrive at a
contradiction, apply Metatheorem 2 in the variable t′, with (t′a, t
′
b, t
′
c) = (0, 1, 2).
We find that S(1) = S′(1) = limt′→1− S′(t′) = limt→1+ S(t), which contradicts
the previous application of Metatheorem 2 in the variable t.
Remark 6. Corollary 1 refutes an important classical requirement, namely,
time reversal invariance of many physical processes, such as, those that obey the
laws of classical mechanics. The reason for this contradiction is the nonclassical
requirement of Metatheorem 2 that limit processes are physically realized via
supertasks. The limit process in the time reversed direction, namely, limt→t+b ,
is physically realized via a different supertask than that used in the physical
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time variable t for the proof of Metatheorem 2, which yields a different limiting
value for S(tb). The key observation here is that supertasks are not really time
reversible, in the following sense. A time reversed supertask has no first step
and hence cannot even be considered a well-defined task, let alone a supertask.
In particular, for a supertask that terminates at a limit point in time (t = tb
in this case), any first step in the time reversed direction would necessarily
cover infinitely many steps of the original (physical) supertask, which therefore
cannot be considered a supertask in the time reversed direction. Clearly, the
time reversed supertask can have at most finitely many steps, because infinitely
many steps of the original supertask have been coalesced into a single first step.
It is important to note that one particularly absurd consequence of classical time
reversal invariance in the infinite relay dichotomy paradox of Sec. 1.4 or in
the “beautiful supertask” of Laraudogoitia [14], namely, the spontaneous self-
excitation of velocities in an infinite sequence of particles that are initially at
rest, with the consequent failure of conservation of momentum, is ruled out by
Corollary 1.
Remark 7. Consider the simplest possible example of a discontinuous physical
process, namely, an elastic collision between two particles of equal mass mov-
ing in opposite directions. Let the collision happen at (x, t) = (0, 1), with the
initial positions and velocities of the particles specified as follows. Particle 1
(Particle 2) starts at x = −1 (x = 1) and has velocity v1 = 1 (v2 = −1),
if t ∈ [0, 1). After the collision the velocity of Particle 1 (Particle 2) changes
to v1 = −1 (v2 = 1), if t ∈ (1, 2]. Taking S(t) for each particle to be its ve-
locity and with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2), an application of Metatheorem 2 in the
physical time variable t yields (v1, v2) = (1,−1) at the time of collision, t = 1.
This implies that the momentum transfer due to the collision at t = 1 does not
happen at t = 1, but does so for arbitrarily close times t > 1. For the time
reversed version of this collision, make the change of variables v′ = −v and
t′ = 2 − t, and let (t′a, t′b, t′c) = (0, 1, 2). An application of Metatheorem 2 now
yields (v′1, v
′
2) = (1,−1) at t′ = 1, which translates to (v1, v2) = (−1, 1) at t = 1.
Thus the time reversed application of Metatheorem 2 results in the contradic-
tory conclusion that the momentum transfer due to the collision did happen at
t = 1, which illustrates the failure, demonstrated in Corollary 1, of time reversal
invariance.
Remark 8. Elastic collisions are probably among the most fundamental of phys-
ical processes occurring at the microscopic level. In Ref. [8], we will see that
the logic NAFL, with its time-dependent truth and paraconsistency, supports the
conclusion that the momentum transfer must happen precisely at the time of col-
lision. Further, Metatheorem 2 cannot be formulated in NAFL, which does not
permit the existence of half open real intervals or of sequences of real numbers
that exclude their limit points. These facts enable the NAFL version of New-
tonian mechanics to uphold time reversal invariance for discontinuous physical
processes, such as, elastic collisions.
Remark 9. Metatheorem 2 and Corollary 1 force us to consider the following
options.
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• The first option is to accept that the time reversal invariance of the clas-
sical laws of nature, such as, the laws of Newtonian mechanics, requires
the time reversibility of physical processes governed by these laws. Accep-
tance of this requirement would in turn throw up two possibilities. The
first possibility is to reject Metatheorem 2, thereby ignoring its obvious
truth and effectively ignoring a metamathematical inconsistency in classi-
cal infinitary reasoning, while maintaining the claim of formal consistency.
The second possibility is to accept Metatheorem 2 and Corollary 1 as true
within classical logic and thereby reject classical infinitary reasoning as
inconsistent. It is this latter possibility that will be pursued in Ref. [8], to
make the case for the logic NAFL.
• The second option is to drop the classical requirement of time reversal in-
variance of physical processes and accept that there is an inviolable arrow
of time. This option is not really viable as a means of salvaging classical
infinitary reasoning, for it would eventually lead to further inconsisten-
cies. Most importantly, an inviolable arrow of time imposed as a logical
requirement (via Metatheorem 2 and Corollary 1) would contradict classi-
cal theories, such as, Newtonian mechanics and in particular, the theory
of special relativity, which requires coordinate invariance for its formula-
tion. The conventional wisdom is that an arrow of time is not a logical
requirement, but could physically exist, for example, as a result of initial
conditions and certain physical laws, such as, the second law of thermody-
namics.
Remark 10. We may now revisit the previously considered examples of Zeno’s
dichotomy paradox, and also consider the famous Thomson’s lamp experiment,
from the point of view of Metatheorem 2.
• The spatial and temporal dichotomy paradoxes (Secs. 1.5.1and 1.5.2) are
covered by the following choice of S(t):
S(t) = t if t ∈ [0, 1) and S(t) = −1 if t > 1. (16)
Here “S(t) = t” is interpreted as “Homer is conscious at time t (and
has made a mark at x = t)”, where we add the latter part in the spatial
version of the paradox, and “S(t) = −1” is interpreted as “Homer is dead
at time t”. Applying Metatheorem 2 in the physical time variable t with
(ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2) yields S(1) = 1, which confirms the contradictions
deduced in Secs. 1.5.1 and 1.5.2. This application of Metatheorem 2 also
confirms the classical resolution of the spatial and temporal dichotomy
paradoxes in Sec. 1.5.3 (see eq. (12)), which, however, is contradicted by
an application of Metatheorem 2 in the time reversed direction, yielding
S(1) = −1. In the spatial version of the paradox, S(1) = 1 implies that the
markings would constitute a line segment of unit length. In particular, a
mark was made at x = 1, indicating that Homer was alive at this location.
• The spatial dichotomy paradox can be viewed as an attempt by Homer
to construct the half open real interval [0, 1) by extending a line segment
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through all lengths less than one in the infinite series {1/2, 3/4, 7/8, . . .},
starting from x = 0. Metatheorem 2 tells us that this is not possible
without extending the line segment to x = 1, that is, to length one, in
the same way that it is impossible to extend a line segment through all
finite lengths without creating an infinite length (see Remark 4). Thus it
is a mathematical fact that Homer will reach x = 1 upon completing this
supertask, as is classically permissible. Metatheorem 2 provides us with
the stronger (nonclassical) result that Homer must necessarily reach x = 1
in the ‘alive’ state upon completion of this supertask.
• With S(t) defined as in (16), consider the infinite relay run example of
Sec. 1.4. In this case “S(t) = t” is interpreted as either “The baton has
reached x = t” or “ There exists n ∈ N such that Homer(n) has carried
the baton to x = t”, and “S(t) = −1” is interpreted as “The baton has
reached x = 1 and is not in the possession of any of the Homer(n) at
time t”. An application of Metatheorem 2 with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2) yields
S(1) = 1, whose first interpretation noted above is inexplicable and the
second interpretation is a contradiction (as observed in Sec. 1.4), because,
by definition, none of the infinitely many Homer(n) has reached x = 1.
This contradiction cannot be resolved and represents a failure of classical
infinitary reasoning. Note that application of Metatheorem 2 in the time
reversed direction yields the contradictory S(1) = −1, which is inexplicable
and is effectively a rejection of the classical requirement that the infinite
relay supertask can be completed.
• Still retaining S(t) as in (16), consider the Thomson’s lamp experiment
[4, 9], wherein a lamp is switched on (off) at time tn if n is even (odd).
Here the sequence {tn} is defined by (2). Clearly, the infinite succession of
states “on” and “off” does not represent a convergent sequence. However,
we may now interpret “S(t) = t” as “There exists n ∈ N such that the
lamp will be switched to a different state at time tn > t”, and “S(t) = −1”
as “The unspecified state of the lamp remains constant at time t”. Ap-
plication of Metatheorem 2 with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2) yields S(1) = 1, the
falsity of which is essentially a denial that the supertask can be completed
(see Remark 11 below). In the time reversed direction, Metatheorem 2
yields S(1) = −1, which is the contradictory conclusion that the supertask
is complete at t = 1, with the state of the lamp being unspecified. Inter-
estingly, both of these mutually contradictory points of view are prevalent
in the literature [4, 10] and we have deduced both, assuming the classical
requirement of time reversibility. This clearly points to a metamathemat-
ical inconsistency, triggered by Metatheorem 2, within the framework of
classical infinitary reasoning.
Remark 11. Note that in the case of the Thomson’s lamp experiment, Metathe-
orem 2 in the physical variable t assumes that the supertask can be completed,
to arrive at a contradictory result. Hence this application of Metatheorem 2
can be viewed as a proof by contradiction that the supertask cannot be com-
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pleted. It is easy to see that this objection can be made in general for the entire
class of supertasks considered in Metatheorem 2. For example, taking {tn} and
S(t) to be as defined in (2) and (16) respectively, we interpret “S(t) = t” as
“∃n ∈ N(tn > t)” and “S(t) = −1” as “∀n ∈ N(tn < t)”. Application of
Metatheorem 2 with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2) in the physical time variable t yields
S(1) = 1, which is clearly false. Classically, this false result is used to deny the
validity of Metatheorem 2 with the argument that the properties of the interior
points t ∈ [0, 1) (including the sequence {tn}), do not carry over to the end point
(limit point) t = 1 as required by Metatheorem 2. However, we take the position
that Metatheorem 2 is obviously true, given the validity of the classical assump-
tion that supertasks can be completed. Thus the falsity of the result predicted
by Metatheorem 2, namely, S(1) = 1, is actually a proof by contradiction that
supertasks cannot be completed and can be viewed as a confirmation of the non-
classical induction argument of Sec. 1.1, which the logic NAFL supports [8]. We
can possibly ignore this objection when the sequence of states S(tn) converges,
for example, in the spatial and temporal versions of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox.
But we would still run into another contradiction, namely, the failure of time
reversal invariance, which is a classical requirement. Therefore, in our view,
Metatheorem 2 ultimately establishes via contradictions that supertasks cannot
be completed, which calls into question the validity of the classical refutation of
Zeno’s dichotomy paradox in Sec. 1.3, and indeed, the validity of all of classical
infinitary reasoning.
3 Benacerraf’s shrinking genie
Benacerraf [9] proposed a version of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox (see Sec. 1) in
which Homer is replaced by a genie whose height h(t) shrinks continuously in
proportion to the distance covered on x ∈ [0, 1], as follows.
h(t) = h0(1− t), x(t) = t, t ∈ [0, 1], (17)
where we assume that the genie is a one-dimensional creature and h0 > 0 is the
initial height of the genie. Clearly, the genie, which runs at unit velocity, reaches
every point x ∈ [0, 1), but does not reach x = 1, where it vanishes. Here it is
assumed that the genie no longer exists when its height has reduced to zero.
An application of Metatheorem 2 with S(t) = h(t) and (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 1)
confirms that h(1) = 0, i.e., the genie must vanish at x = 1. Next choose
S(t) as in (16), where we interpret “S(t) = t” as “At time t, the genie is
at nonzero height” and “S(t) = −1” as “At time t, the genie has vanished”.
An application of Metatheorem 2 with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 1) yields S(1) = 1,
which is the contradiction that the genie must reach x = 1 at nonzero height.
Benacerraf used this example in an attempt to illustrate his point that the genie
can complete the supertask of sequentially traversing the infinitely many points
xn in (1) without entailing that the genie must reach the limit point x = 1, as
required by Metatheorem 2, which is therefore false from Benacerraf’s point of
view. However, we again take the position that Metatheorem 2 is true subject
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to the underlying classical assumption that the genie can complete supertasks,
which must stand falsified in Benacerraf’s example.
To further elaborate on our position that Metatheorem 2 correctly predicts
a contradiction in this scenario, consider a hypothetical universe in which the
genie has no length scale available other than its own height. The only objects
in this universe are shrinking genies, all of which are of the same height on
t ∈ [0, 1]. As specified in (17), assume that a genie is traveling at unit velocity
in empty space on x ∈ [0, 1) towards a stationary target (another genie) at
x = 1. When the genie is at x = 1/2, its height is h0/2. However, the genie
has no way of perceiving that it has either reached x = 1/2 or that its height
has reduced. The genie can only judge its progress towards the target in terms
of the number of units of its own height that remain to be covered. Thus if the
genie is at some point x ∈ [0, 1), the distance to the target is (1 − x) and the
height of the genie is h0(1−x). The ratio of these two lengths remains constant
at 1/h0, which implies that the genie would not perceive any motion towards
the target or any shrinking of its height. Intuitively, the genie would always
have to take the same number of “steps” to reach the target and there is no
other length scale available to it. Indeed, the genie can only perceive that its
height has shrunk against a fixed standard length, like the meter scale, which it
does not have. Hence, from the point of view of the genie, it remains stationary
at fixed height h0 and at a fixed unit distance from the target genie on t ∈ [0, 1).
In other words, the height of the genie is set at h0 as its standard unit of length
in place of the meter scale, and the genie judges motion based on this standard.
At t = 1, the genie must cover the unit distance to the target at x = 1 and
must also vanish instantaneously. Clearly, these two constraints can be satisfied
if and only if the genie perceives an infinite velocity at t = 1. Note that both
constraints are important here. For example, merely requiring that the genie
vanishes at t = 1 would imply (in the genie’s coordinate system) that the genie
has not even started the supertask of covering the unit distance to the target
before vanishing.
Thus in terms of the genie’s coordinates, we are able to deduce the con-
tradiction, without any appeal to Metatheorem 2, that the genie has reached
x = 1 at height h0 (and has collided with the target genie of the same height),
and the genie has not reached x = 1, where it vanishes (along with the target
genie) instantaneously. This contradiction can only be resolved by rejecting the
classical assumption that the genie can complete supertasks. Note that there
are two supertasks of interest here, namely, that the traveling genie catches up
with the target genie and also that the heights of the genies reduce to zero at
t = 1 (i.e., Zeno’s dichotomy paradox exists in two dimensions in this exam-
ple). Let the traveling genie apply Metatheorem 2 to this scenario in its own
coordinate system, taking S(t) on t ∈ [0, 1) to be the fixed height h(t) = h0 of
the genies and also the fixed distance d(t) = 1 between the genies respectively,
and with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 1). Clearly, the traveling genie would conclude that
(h(1), d(1)) = (h0, 1), implying that neither of these supertasks can be com-
pleted, as predicted by the nonclassical induction argument of Sec. 1.1 and in
contradiction to the requirements of classical logic.
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Let there be a stationary shrinking genie at x = 0 in the postulated hypo-
thetical universe. The stationary genie would consider its height to be fixed at
h0 (assumed to be the only available length scale) and would therefore observe
that both the traveling genie and the target genie are also at fixed height h0,
at a fixed unit distance from each other, and are both receding at an increasing
velocity proportional to (1 − t)−2, as can be seen from the following. Recall
that the traveling genie starts at x = 0 and travels at unit velocity, so that its
path is described by x(t) = t, and the target genie is at x = 1. Let (x1(t), h1(t))
and (x2(t), h2(t)) be the coordinates of the traveling genie and the target genie
respectively, from the viewpoint of the stationary genie, which fixes its height
at h0 as the standard unit of length. It is easy to see that
x1(t) =
t
1− t , x2(t) =
1
1− t , t ∈ [0, 1)→ (h1(t) = h2(t) = h0),
dx1
dt
=
dx2
dt
=
1
(1− t)2 , t ∈ [0, 1)→ (x2(t)− x1(t) = 1),
x1(1) = x2(1) =
dx1
dt
(1) =
dx2
dt
(1) = +∞, (18)
where x1(t) ∈ R¯, x2(t) ∈ R¯, t ∈ [0, 1] and R¯ denotes the extended real number
system, which has been used to remove the singularity at t = 1. From the point
of view of an observer external to the postulated hypothetical universe, the in-
finities occur here because the length scale of the stationary genie has shrunk
to zero at t = 1. Observe that (x2(1) − x1(1)), being of the form (∞−∞), is
undefined in the extended real number system. We also need to define h1(1)
and h2(1). There are three possibilities here, all of which lead to contradic-
tions, as follows. A natural definition, which follows from an application of
Metatheorem 2, would be
x2(1)− x1(1) = 1, h1(1) = h2(1) = h0, (19)
which implies that the traveling genie does not complete the two supertasks of
catching up with the target genie and also vanishing (along with the target genie)
at t = 1. Alternatively, we could define, in partial violation of Metatheorem 2,
x2(1)− x1(1) = 0, h1(1) = h2(1) = h0. (20)
Here the viewpoint of the stationary genie would confirm the contradiction that
the traveling genie catches up with the target genie at nonzero height h0 and
collides with it before both vanish instantaneously. Thirdly, we could set, in
violation of Metatheorem 2,
h1(1) = h2(1) = 0. (21)
In this case, by assumption, neither the genies nor their coordinates x1(1) and
x2(1) exist at t = 1 and therefore the traveling genie does not complete the
supertask of catching up with the target genie before both vanish.
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We have seen that the contradictions that exist in (18) at t = 1, which fol-
low from (19)–(21), are also present in (17) if we accept Metatheorem 2. While
the contradictions in (18) do not result from an explicit use of Metatheorem 2,
(18) does require the use of the extended real number system in order to re-
move the singularities that would otherwise result at t = 1. The consequent
infinities in (18) at t = 1 may also be thought of as resulting from a tacit use
of Metatheorem 2 (see Remark 4). As noted previously, these contradictions
must be attributed to the underlying classical assumption that supertasks can
be completed.
3.1 Newtonian kinematics versus relativistic kinematics
It should be emphasized that from the point of view of Newtonian kinematics,
(17) and (18) are entirely equivalent. Note that replacement of h0 by h0(1− t)
in (18) would imply that the length scale of the genie is frozen at the initial
value (h0) of its height, which is now shrinking by a factor of (1− t). Therefore
the distances x1(t) and x2(t) must also shrink by the same factor, which would
imply
x1(t) = t, x2(t) = 1,
and we recover (17), as we should. What (18) expresses is that if, at any point
of time, we assign the number h0 to the height of the genies as the standard of
length, the stated distances and velocities would follow. Keeping in mind that
the number we assign to a length standard is fixed and purely arbitrary and
all other lengths are relative to this standard, this is an entirely consistent and
kinematically equivalent description of the physical ‘reality’ that (17) expresses.
An observer external to the postulated hypothetical universe would hold the
view that the genies are shrinking as in (17), while the genies would maintain
that their universe is expanding with respect to their fixed height h0, as in (18).
Purely from the point of view of kinematics, it ought to be impossible to say
which of these two scenarios is the underlying ‘reality’, if one rejects Platonism
as a philosophy of physics. However, this equivalence between (17) and (18)
does not hold in the kinematics of special relativity theory (SR), wherein the
Lorentz transformations apply and according to which (18) is illegal, essentially
due to an illegitimate choice of the standard of length by the genies. Indeed,
SR requires that the length standard be chosen such that the velocity of light in
vacuum is a defined constant c, in order to conform with the light postulate of
SR. Assuming that the standard of length in the Cartesian coordinate system
of (17) is chosen to uphold the defined value c of the velocity of light, the time
τg taken by light to traverse the height of the genies would be measured, by an
observer external to the postulated hypothetical universe, as
τg =
h0(1− t)
c
, t ∈ [0, 1). (22)
Hence the external observer would conclude that the genies are shrinking, and
that their height is h0(1− t). The genies would also measure exactly the same
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value of τg as in (22) for light to traverse their height, which they fix at the value
h0 as their standard of length. It follows that the velocity of light in vacuum
(cg) in the coordinate system of (18) would be measured by the genies as
cg ≈ c
1− t , t ∈ [0, 1), (23)
where the approximation is valid to leading order as c → ∞ or as h0 → 0.
Clearly, (23) is in violation of the light postulate of SR and it follows that
(18) is illegitimate in SR. Note also that the velocities of the genies in (18)
exceed the velocity of light cg in (23) by an order of magnitude as t → 1−,
which is also not allowed in SR. Thus relativistic kinematics picks out (17) as a
Platonic reality and one may conclude that Platonism, rejected in the proposed
finitistic logic NAFL, is inherent in SR. This issue is important and deserves
further elaboration. When relativistic kinematics requires that the genies are
shrinking, we have a right to ask, shrinking with respect to what? If one views
the shrinking of the genies as the motion of one endpoint of the genie towards
the other, a consistent theory of kinematics must hold that such a shrinking
motion can only be relative to another material object of fixed length, which
we may postulate as the length standard. But the only material objects in
the postulated hypothetical universe are the genies themselves. Therefore the
only alternative for the genies is to hold their own height as the fixed standard
of length and conclude that their universe is expanding with respect to this
standard, in violation of SR. A theory based solely on kinematics cannot reject
this alternative if it establishes that motion is truly relative, as it should. One
could assert that the genies are shrinking with respect to their initial height h0.
But if this is the case, at any given time t > 0 there is no material object in
the postulated hypothetical universe that would correspond to the length h0.
Relativistic kinematics defines this standard length h0 without any reference
to material objects, as the distance traveled by light in vacuum in the time
h0/c, where c is a defined constant. In our view, this is essentially an assertion
of the existence of absolute space, e.g., the pre-relativistic ether, which SR
itself rejects as a completely unverifiable Platonic reality. In other words, the
kinematics of SR freezes the initial height h0 of the genies in the vacuum (ether)
of absolute space and purports to measure the shrinking of the genies with
respect to this preexisting, Platonic and unverifiable length standard. Note
that an observer external to the postulated hypothetical universe, for whom
(17) holds, is assumed to have access to a material object of precisely the length
h0, which can in principle be held as the length standard and with respect to
which c can be recovered as a measured constant.
The inability of relativistic kinematics to support (18) in the postulated
hypothetical universe suggests a possible metamathematical inconsistency in
SR, because our contention is that (18) can only be rejected, if at all, by invoking
alternative theories, such as, dynamics. Indeed, in Sec. 4, we will demonstrate
that Metatheorem 2 also contradicts the key requirement of SR that invalidates
(18), namely, that c is an unattainable upper bound for the velocities of massive
objects. Hence, in our opinion, the attempt to invoke relativity theory as a
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solution to Zeno’s dichotomy paradox, e.g. in Sec. 3.7 of Ref. [15], fails.
3.2 The NAFL fix for the contradictions in (17)-(18)
As noted previously, the main objection to (18) is that the use of the extended
real number system leads to the contradictions which follow from (19)–(21).
We have pointed out that the contradictions also exist in (17) if one accepts
Metatheorem 2 and must be attributed to the underlying assumption of classical
logic that supertasks can be completed. Here we will briefly outline how these
contradictions can be resolved in the logic NAFL; the details will be available in
Ref. [8]. By eliminating these contradictions, the NAFL version of Newtonian
kinematics upholds the equivalence between (17) and (18), as any legitimate
theory of kinematics should.
In the logic NAFL, it is not even possible to formulate Benacerraf’s example
of the shrinking genie, which is postulated to exist only when t ∈ [0, 1), because
the half open interval [0, 1) does not exist in the NAFL version of real analy-
sis [8, 7]. Therefore the first modification required by NAFL to Benacerraf’s
formulation is that the genie must continue to exist even when its height has
shrunk to zero, i.e., the genie must be treated as a point mass at t = 1 in (17)
and (18). Of course, such a formulation, which satisfies conservation of mass,
would invalidate the basic premise in Benacerraf’s argument. The next step
needed in NAFL to uphold the equivalence between (17) and (18) is to modify
(21) as follows:
h1(1) = h2(1) = 0, x2(1)− x1(1) = 0. (24)
Note that the coordinates x1(1) and x2(1) must now exist, because the genies
do exist at t = 1. With this formulation, (17) and (18) (along with (24)) are
equivalent in the NAFL version of Newtonian kinematics without the contra-
dictions that result in classical logic from an application of Metatheorem 2.
This is so because neither Zeno’s dichotomy paradox nor Metatheorem 2 can be
formulated in NAFL, which does not permit the existence of half open real in-
tervals or of sequences of real numbers that exclude their limit points. Further,
the paraconsistent and time-dependent nature of NAFL truth correctly handles
the step discontinuities at t = 1 in h1(t), h2(t) and (x2(t) − x1(t)) that result
from (24), without implying the existence of open or half open intervals of real
numbers, as elaborated in Ref. [8].
4 Metamathematical inconsistencies in special
relativity theory and Newtonian mechanics
We present another argument for the inconsistency of special relativity theory
(SR) that uses Metatheorem 2 without any appeal to the failure of time reversal
invariance, which, as noted in Sec. 2, is already a fatal contradiction. Both of
these logical inconsistencies in SR, which occur at the metamathematical (rather
than formal) level, are also present in classical Newtonian mechanics. We will
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briefly outline how the finitistic reasoning of the logic NAFL can be used to fix
these inconsistencies for Newtonian mechanics, but not for SR, whose reasoning
is infinitary by the NAFL yardstick.
In a region where SR is applicable, let a particle of rest mass m0 > 0 have
a linear velocity v ≥ 0 with respect to an inertial frame of reference. It is well
known that v must satisfy the constraint v < c, where c is the velocity of light
in vacuum. Thus SR allows the particle to attain every velocity less than c, but
not v = c, which is a singular point at which the theory becomes ill defined. In
particular, consider the following velocity profile:
v(t)
c
= t, if t ∈ [0, 1) and v(t)
c
= 0.99, if t ∈ [1, 2]. (25)
Here t is a dimensionless time as measured by a clock at rest in the inertial frame
of reference. Note that v → c as t → 1−, and hence there is a discontinuity in
the velocity at t = 1, which could happen, for example, due to a collision. As
the particle accelerates on t ∈ [0, 1), its mass m and energy E increase without
bound:
m(t) =
m0√
1− t2 , E(t) = m(t)c
2, t ∈ [0, 1). (26)
Nevertheless, the energy and mass of the particle remain finite and v < c at each
instant t ∈ [0, 2], which makes (25) a legitimate definition in SR. It should be
emphasized that we are concerned here with only the logical feasibility of (25)
and not its practical feasibility, which is obviously highly problematic. Indeed,
the primary logical requirement is consistency. Even if a logical inconsistency is
demonstrated in an impractical scenario, it has serious implications for SR as a
deductive system.
Apply Metatheorem 2 to (25) and (26) with (ta, tb, tc) = (0, 1, 2), and with
S(t) taken in turn as v(t)/c, m(t) and E(t). This yields
v(1) = c, m(1) = E(1) = +∞, (27)
which contradicts (25). Note that the extended real number system R¯ has
been used to define m(1) and E(1). From (27) we conclude that SR must
necessarily hit the singularity at t = 1, where the theory becomes ill defined
and inconsistent, despite the fact that the velocity profile defined in (25) is
strictly within the range of validity of SR. This logical inconsistency in SR is at
the metamathematical level and will become formal if we add Metatheorem 2
as an axiom to SR.
To understand why Metatheorem 2 is presenting the correct picture in this
case, namely, one of inconsistency of SR, let us temporarily ignore (27) and
assume that (25) is legitimate, as required by SR (and as also supported by
an application of Metatheorem 2 in the time reversed direction). Consider the
energy lost by the particle due to the discontinuous drop in velocity at t = 1.
Intuitively, one feels that the particle lost an infinite amount of energy at t = 1
because, from (26), E(t)→∞ as t→ 1−. But this intuitive conclusion is false,
because, as noted, E(t) is finite at each instant t ∈ [0, 2]. There is no question of
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the particle losing an infinite amount of energy if in the first place its energy did
not become infinite at any point of time, in particular, “just before” t = 1, as
our intuition falsely tells us. The only remaining possibility is that the energy
loss at t = 1 is finite, but this is also clearly false because the energy of the
particle has exceeded every finite magnitude as t → 1−. Hence loyalty to SR
leads us to the untenable conclusion that the energy lost by the particle due to
the velocity discontinuity at t = 1 can be neither finite nor infinite.
The key to resolving this contradiction is in the assertion made above that
E(t) has exceeded every finite magnitude. This is the same as accepting that
the velocity of the particle has exceeded every magnitude less than c, which
implies that the particle completed the supertask of attaining infinitely many
velocities in the sequence {v(tn)}, where tn is as defined in (2). The proof of
Metatheorem 2 uses the completion of precisely such supertasks to conclude
the inconsistency of SR via (27). Clearly, the velocity of the particle cannot
be increased through every magnitude less than c without the particle attaining
v = c, and this is a basic mathematical fact (in the same way that it is impossible
to extend a line segment through every finite length without creating an infinite
length, as noted in Remark 4). Note that even with (27) in place, we cannot
conclude that an infinite amount of energy is acquired by the particle at t =
1. We may only conclude that SR is inconsistent and one cannot believe the
predictions of an inconsistent theory formulated in classical logic, which allows
an arbitrary proposition to be deduced in inconsistent theories (via the principle
of explosion, also known as ex falso quodlibet (EFQ)).
4.1 Classical objection and rebuttal
A possible classical objection to the above claim of inconsistency might be that
the supertasks used in the proof of Metatheorem 2 cannot be completed as
assumed because they require an infinite amount of energy. The substance
of this objection is that the supertasks in question, if completable, must get
completed in the half open time interval [0, 1) without the existence of a time of
completion in [0, 1) because supertasks do not have a last step. This would result
in the particle acquiring an infinite amount of energy in the time interval [0, 1)
without the commitment that SR has hit the singularity at t = 1. According to
this classical argument, the fact that the supertasks remain incomplete for each
t ∈ [0, 1) does not imply that the supertasks are incomplete in the entire half
open time interval [0, 1), for such a conclusion would require a classically illegal
interchange of universal and existential quantifiers. Thus the classical objection
amounts to asserting that (25) is illegitimate in the sense of being unphysical,
without the consequence that SR is inconsistent, that is, the limit processes
(v → c−, m(t) → ∞ and E(t) → ∞) as t → 1− are not actually realized at
t = 1. This argument is rejected in Metatheorem 2, wherein the completion
of the said supertasks is nonclassically equated with the physical realization of
these limit processes at t = 1. Each step of these supertasks adds only finite
amounts of energy and mass to the particle and is therefore physically realizable
in principle. It follows by induction that there is no upper limit to the number of
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steps of these supertasks that can be completed. It is a requirement of classical
logic that such a step by step infinite process must result in completion, which
does not happen at any point of time in the interval [0, 1).
Let us further consider the specific example of a particle P attaining each
velocity in the sequence {v(tn)}, where v and tn are as defined as in (25) and
(2) respectively. This supertask may be broken up into infinitely many finite
parts, as was done in Sec. 1.4 for the infinite relay dichotomy paradox. Let {Pn}
represent an infinite sequence of particles such that for each n ∈ N , the particle
Pn is accelerated to the velocity v(tn) at time tn (say, via instantaneous, finite
impulses). Clearly, there is no particle in {Pn} that has reached the velocity c
or has acquired infinite energy and mass, and hence each velocity in {v(tn)} is
in principle attainable from the standpoint of SR. It should follow as a logical
consequence that for each n ∈ N , a single particle P may be accelerated to
velocity v(tn) at time tn, because logically, if the infnite-particle supertask is
completable, the same holds for the single-particle supertask. This is so because
there is a one-to-one correspondence in time between each of the infinitely many
particles achieving velocity vn at time tn and a single particle achieving each
velocity vn at time tn. Hence SR should permit the single-particle supertask to
be completed without P reaching the velocity c (and acquiring infinite energy
and mass), as required by (25). Yet this classical conclusion is contradicted
by Metatheorem 2, as demonstrated in (27). As in Sec. 1.4, we may conclude
that the reason for this metamathematical inconsistency in SR is the fact that
classical logic requires that supertasks should be completable.
The only way to correctly infer that supertasks cannot be completed is via
the nonclassical induction argument of Sec. 1.1, and if we accept this argument
(as does the logic NAFL), all of classical infinitary reasoning, including SR,
would become inconsistent. Let us also note that from a classical point of view,
it is not logically inconsistent to suppose the existence of energy sources that
can supply an unlimited, but finite amount of energy. Such sources could be
distributed along the entire path of the particle (say, as a force field) and supply
the required energy for the supertasks, step by step.
4.2 The Newtonian case and the NAFL resolution
Essentially the same arguments as in Sec. 4 apply for the Newtonian case, with
the only difference being that Newtonian mechanics becomes inconsistent at
v = +∞ rather than at v = c. Consider the following velocity profile, with
respect to an inertial frame of reference, of a particle of mass m:
v(t) =
1√
1− t , if t ∈ [0, 1) and v(t) = 1, if t ∈ [1, 2]. (28)
The velocity v(t) of the particle and its kinetic energy, E(t) = mv(t)2/2, become
unbounded as t → 1−. An application of Metatheorem 2 with (ta, tb, tc) =
(0, 1, 2) yields v(1) = E(1) = +∞, which contradicts (28) and implies the
metamathematical inconsistency of classical Newtonian mechanics. Again the
supertasks used in the proof of Metatheorem 2 require only a finite amount
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of energy at each step and should be classically completable because they are
defined entirely within t ∈ [0, 1) and v is finite everywhere in (28).
This metamathematical inconsistency in classical Newtonian mechanics is
fixable in the logic NAFL, as will be elaborated upon in Ref. [8]. The NAFL
version of real analysis [8, 7] does not allow quantification over real numbers.
Superclasses of real numbers can be defined without quantification in NAFL, but
such superclasses must necessarily be closed, that is, include their limit points.
In particular, only closed intervals of real numbers are allowed in NAFL and the
half open time interval [0, 1) does not exist. The superclass of all real numbers
(i.e., the real line) must necessarily include the limit points ±∞ in the NAFL
version of real analysis. It follows that (28) is not a legitimate definition in the
NAFL version of Newtonian mechanics, which does not allow the paradoxical
classical assertion that a particle can attain (and exceed) every finite positive
velocity when t ∈ [0, 1) without attaining v = +∞ at t = 1. The fact that a
massive object can attain an infinite velocity if an infinite amount of energy is
put into it is not an inconsistency in Newtonian mechanics; it only represents
a practically unrealizable scenario. Every finite value of the energy / velocity
is logically (but not practically) attainable for a massive object in Newtonian
mechanics and hence NAFL, unlike classical logic, mandates that an infinite
value of the energy / velocity is also a logically attainable limit. Secondly, as
noted in Remark 8, time reversal invariance does hold in the NAFL version of
Newtonian mechanics.
Unfortunately, these NAFL fixes for Newtonian mechanics are not applicable
to SR, which requires open (and half open) intervals of real numbers, as well
as time reversal invariance, for its definition. That a massive object is allowed
to attain every velocity less than c, but not v = c, is an integral fact of SR
which requires the existence of the half open real interval [0, c), not permitted
in NAFL. In other words, SR requires that v = c for a massive object is a logically
unattainable limit at which SR becomes inconsistent. Hence SR is an infinitary
theory as per the strict definition of finitism in NAFL, which also does not
permit non-Euclidean geometries, such as, Minkowski spacetime. Nevertheless,
SR is a highly successful theory and it remains to be seen if some of its formulas
are recoverable in NAFL via a suitable modification of Newtonian mechanics in
an Euclidean framework of space and time.
5 The sentence “I committed suicide”
There has been considerable interest among philosophers and logicians in self-
referential ‘liar’ sentences, such as, “I am a liar” or “This sentence is not true”,
which have attracted a voluminous literature [21, 22, 23]. While there is a con-
sensus among the mainstream thinkers that these liar sentences are illegitimate,
there is no clarity on why this should be the case from a logical point of view.
Part of the problem is that the dominant philosophy of classical logic is Platon-
ism, wherein truths are eternal and independent of the human mind. From a
Platonic standpoint, the sentence “I am a liar” is logically equivalent to “X is a
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liar”, where X is the individual to which “I” in the original sentence refers. Note
that the latter sentence, unlike the original, is merely a statement of a matter of
fact that is independent of the human being (other than X) who utters it. Thus
the Platonic equivalent of “I am a liar” seems to be perfectly legitimate and
does not appear to be tied in any way to infinitary reasoning. Classical logic
does permit certain self-referential sentences. For example, the Go¨del sentence
[24], equivalent to “This sentence is not provable”, can be formalized in finitistic
classical theories.
Here we consider the sentence “I committed suicide” (henceforth abbreviated
as ICS), which, as we will demonstrate, has a significance for finitary reasoning
that has remained unexplored so far. To study ICS from a classical point of
view, we set up the temporal dichotomy paradox (see Secs. 1.5.2 and 1.5.3) as
follows.
• Homer shoots himself at time t = 0.
• Homer is alive if t ∈ [0, 1] .
• At t = 1, Homer has the thought “I committed suicide”. Here we assume,
for convenience, that thoughts can occur instantaneously.
• Homer is dead if t > 1.
• The autopsy establishes the cause of death as Homer’s self-inflicted bullet
injury and the time of death as t = 1.
Note that the sentence ICS occurs as Homer’s final thought before he dies. At
first sight the truth of ICS in this scenario seems almost obvious. The ‘I’ in “I
committed suicide” refers to the individual Homer in the present context, which
therefore dictates that
I committed suicide⇔ Homer committed suicide. (29)
The sentence on the left hand side of (29) is one that can only be asserted by
a human being, while that on the right hand side is a statement of a matter
of fact, with no apparent connection to the human mind. Nevertheless this
equivalence is classically valid because of the prevalent philosophy of classical
logic, namely, Platonism. It follows that ICS is true from the point of view of
classical logic because Homer did commit suicide, as confirmed by the autopsy.
One might object to the above classical interpretation of ICS as follows. On
the left hand side of (29) is an assertion by Homer of his suicide as a completed
act, for the sentence ICS essentially means “I have killed myself”. There is a
seeming contradiction here, for Homer was alive at t = 1 when he made this
mental assertion of his own death, and indeed, had to be alive, for dead men
can have no thoughts. The counter to this objection is that classical truths in
the Platonic universe are eternal, that is, time-independent. From the point of
view of classical logic, the time at which Homer asserted ICS is immaterial to
its truth because it is a fact that Homer’s suicide was eventually proven. This
time-independence is precisely what the equivalence in (29) expresses.
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There is a second, more interesting semi-classical interpretation of the truth
of ICS in the present context that overrules the above objection, albeit controver-
sially. Although a time of death does not formally exist in the given formulation
of Homer’s suicide, the idea is to nevertheless impose the time of death as t = 1
(as confirmed by the autopsy) in a metamathematical sense, via an application
of Metatheorem 2 in the time reversed direction. The resulting contradiction
that Homer is both alive and dead at t = 1 gets pushed to the metatheory,
while the formal classical theory remains consistent. From this point of view,
Homer did witness his own death at t = 1, although this contradiction is not
formally provable, given that Metatheorem 2 is a nonclassical, metamathemat-
ical result. Therefore Homer’s assertion of ICS at t = 1 can be argued to be
true even when the time-dependence of truth is taken into account, without
any need to invoke the equivalence in (29). This interpretation is interesting
because it clearly ties the truth of ICS to classical infinitary reasoning, which, in
the process of refuting Zeno’s temporal dichotomy paradox (see Secs. 1.5.2 and
1.5.3), enables Homer to witness his own death by permitting him to complete
the supertask of sequentially traversing infinitely many durations in finite time.
Whereas, according to the purely classical, Platonic interpretation of ICS, as
symbolized by (29), the truth of ICS does not have any obvious connection to
infinitary reasoning. In fact, according to conventional wisdom, the sentence
ICS can be formalized in finitistic classical theories.
We briefly touch upon the interpretation of ICS in the logic NAFL [8]. We
have already noted in Sec. 1.5.3 that a precise moment of death must exist in
NAFL, which does not support (12). The NAFL formulation of Homer’s suicide
would be as follows.
Homer shoots himself at time t = 0 and dies at t = 1. (30)
It is clearly impossible for a dead Homer to assert ICS at t = 1. Therefore the
contradiction that Homer witnessed his own death is not permitted in NAFL.
Homer can only assert ICS when he is alive, e.g., at some time t¯, where 0 ≤
t¯ < 1. NAFL truths, being axiomatic assertions of the human mind, are time-
dependent [5, 6, 7, 8]. It follows that ICS is unambiguously false in NAFL,
despite the fact that Homer did commit suicide, because Homer was alive when
he made the assertion ICS. Clearly, the equivalence in (29) does not hold in
NAFL, which rejects the classically acceptable philosophy of Platonism. By the
NAFL yardstick, a different equivalence must hold in the present context:
ICS(t)⇔ At time t, Homer committed suicide and witnessed his own death.
(31)
Here, ICS(t) denotes the sentence ICS asserted at time t, which, in the present
context, refers to Homer’s suicide and can only be asserted by Homer himself.
Clearly, the NAFL restrictions imply that Homer can assert ICS(t) truthfully if
and only if Homer did commit suicide at time t and is able to witness his own
death at that time, as asserted in (31). Note that “committed suicide” in (31)
refers to the completion of the act of suicide, that is, to Homer’s death; the initi-
ation of Homer’s suicide, namely, the act of shooting himself, has no relevance in
34
this context. Evidently, the right hand side of (31) (and consequently, ICS(t))
is a metamathematical contradiction which, as we have seen from the NAFL
formulation of Homer’s suicide in (30), is unambiguously false, and indeed, im-
possible. It is worth noting that this impossibility occurs because, unlike the
case in classical logic, the nonclassical induction argument of Sec. 1.1 holds in
NAFL and does not permit Homer to complete supertasks. In contrast, we have
seen that according to the semi-classical interpretation, Homer has to complete
supertasks (as required by Metatheorem 2) in order to be able to witness his own
death, and hence the truth of ICS(t) in (31) is permitted by classical infinitary
reasoning, unlike the finitary reasoning of NAFL.
The logical impossibility of completing supertasks and in particular, the
inability of the human mind to complete them, is precisely the reason why
infinite sets cannot exist within NAFL theories [8]. Hence there is a close parallel
between the falsity of ICS(t) in (31) and the nonexistence of infinite sets in NAFL
theories, both of which are metatheoretical results upheld by the nonclassical
induction argument of Sec. 1.1. It should be emphasized that there is no formal
refutation of sentences like “I committed suicide” or “Infinite sets exist” within
NAFL theories, whose syntax does not even permit such sentences.
In summary, NAFL provides new criteria for finitary reasoning by refuting
classical infinitary reasoning at the metamathematical, rather than formal, level.
While choosing between classical logic and NAFL, the reader should consider
whether it is strictly rigorous to accept Platonism and / or the infinitary, non-
constructive reasoning that allows sentences like ICS to be true within classical
logic. We believe that the interests of rigor are better served by accepting the
finitism of NAFL, which makes ICS unambiguously false and indeed, absurd.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have reexamined Zeno’s dichotomy paradox in some detail
and found that its variants lead to metamathematical inconsistencies in classical
infiinitary reasoning, including Newtonian mechanics and the theory of special
relativity. The main reason for these metamathematical (as opposed to formal)
inconsistencies is that the classical refutation of Zeno’s dichotomy paradox (see
Sec. 1.3) requires supertasks to be completed. In Part II of this two-part series
of papers [8], we will outline the basic principles of the finitistic logic NAFL,
including real analysis, and show how these and other paradoxes (including a
few arising from quantum mechanics) are resolved.
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